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Abstract
Do openness and human capital accumulation promote economic growth?
While intuition argues yes, the existing empirical evidence provides mixed sup-
port for such assertions. We examine Cobb-Douglas production function specifi-
cations for a 30-year panel of 83 countries representing all regions of the world
and all income groups. We estimate and compare labor and capital elasticities of
output per worker across each of several income and geographic groups, finding
significant differences in production technology. Then we estimate the total fac-
tor productivity series for each classification. Using determinants of total factor
productivity that include, among many others, human capital, openness, and dis-
tortion of domestic prices relative to world prices, we find significant differences
in results between the overall sample and sub-samples of countries. In particu-
lar, a policy of outward orientation may or may not promote growth in specific
country groups. even if geared to reducing price distortion and increasing open-
ness. Human capital plays a smaller role in enhancing growth through total factor
productivity.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: F43, O47
Keywords: productivity, openness, trade policy, growth
1. Introduction 
Students of international trade commonly believe that international trade policies making a 
country more open to world trade and stimulating human capital accumulation promote a higher 
standard of living. That is, greater outward orientation increases efficiency in the use of 
resources, and encourages production specialization in some industries, in accordance with the 
principle of comparative advantage. The expansion of exports relaxes the foreign exchange 
constraint and accommodates larger imports of key inputs in the production process. Countries 
that pursue greater outward orientation, therefore, can experience faster economic growth. 
Among the external factors that affect growth, improvements in the terms of trade can 
exogenously increase output as well. In addition, the higher the human capital stock within a 
country, the better that country is at adopting the newer technology that promotes economic 
growth. 
The macroeconomic growth literature identifies both factor accumulation and total factor 
productivity as principal determinants of growth. The relative influence of these broad causal 
factors provides a large area of research. In this paper, we separate the contribution of the basic 
inputs in production that directly affect output growth from factors that indirectly influence 
growth, that is, the factors that change the efficiency of those basic inputs. Put differently, those 
other factors in fact determine total factor productivity (TFP). We estimate a series of models, 
using a relatively large dataset, to calculate TFP and to examine a set of external as well as 
domestic factors that affect TFP. 
Most cross-section and panel studies of economic growth put all countries into the same 
basket to estimate the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labor, or to calculate 
returns to scale. Those studies presume that all countries in the sample follow the same overall 
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technology. A cursory examination of the wide disparities in per capita income and growth rates 
across countries, however, raises serious doubts on such a presumption. Countries that occupy 
different rungs of the development ladder probably also occupy different rungs of the 
technological ladder. Geographical and cultural differences can constrain the rate at which 
countries adopt modern technology.1 Our paper examines whether countries in different income 
groups and geographical locations display similar output elasticities with respect to inputs, 
and/or similar returns to scale. 
Expanded versions of the neo-classical growth model importantly assume that human 
capital directly enters the production function along with labor and physical capital (Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil, 1992; Mankiw, 1005, and Miller and Upadhyay, 2000). Earlier attempts 
generally fail to uncover a significant contribution of human capital to output in large samples of 
countries, most likely due to severe measurement problems of human capital.  In this paper, we 
calculate TFP employing only physical capital and labor in the production function and consider 
how human capital, along with variables capturing outward orientation, influences TFP.2  
Our main findings include the following. For low-income countries, output responds 
much more to labor than to capital. That is, the output elasticity with respect to labor exceeds 
that with respect to capital. The total elasticity of output with respect to capital and labor for the 
low-income countries implies increasing returns to scale. That result, however, reverses itself for 
the middle- and high-income countries that display decreasing returns to scale. Thus, the returns 
to scale for different income groups or regions depends on the level of development. 
                                                          
1 Many studies emphasize the importance of such differences in growth. Culture plays a large role in the 
explanations provided, for instance, by Landes (1999) and Sachs (2000). Among other development constraints, 
differences in geography prove pivotal in Sachs (2001), who explores "the difficulty of applying temperate-zone 
technological advances in the tropical setting." (abstract). 
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When we classify countries by geographic regions instead, our previous results based on 
income categories extend only to Africa. African economies exhibit increasing returns to scale, 
while Asia, Europe, and Latin America show nearly constant returns to scale. That is, returns to 
scale for Asia, Europe, and Latin America all cluster around 1, indicating that constant returns 
may adequately approximate all regions except Africa. 
We also find that countries in the middle-income group display elasticity characteristics 
closer to those for high-income countries than for low-income countries. Apart from relatively 
similar returns to scale estimate, the middle-income countries also possess a labor elasticity of 
output nearly equal to that for the high-income group. On the other hand, the elasticity of output 
with respect to capital is the highest in the middle-income countries, followed by low-income 
and high-income countries. If middle-income countries match high-income countries in the rate 
of technological progress, but accumulate capital more quickly, then their output should respond 
more rapidly to both those sources of growth. Our findings support such a story. 
We find similar results for African and low-income countries despite the fact that 5 out of 
19 countries in Africa do not belong to the low-income group, and 8 out of 22 countries in the 
low-income category do not belong to the African group. 
Our assertion that all countries do not use the same technology also finds support from 
our estimates of total factor productivity. Our first set of total factor productivity estimates 
employs a panel-data fixed-effect regression for all countries with no control for regional or 
income differences. The second and third sets of total factor productivity estimates come from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 The argument relies on the vintage mix of capital and skill mix of labor, each with different levels of productivity, 
that are more naturally captured in terms of total factor productivity. 
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the composite series of TFP that use separate regressions for income groups and for geographic 
regions.  
The results differ markedly. While middle- and high-income countries show small 
coefficients of variation in total factor productivity, around 7 percent of the mean, the 
corresponding coefficients for the low-income countries range from 55 percent to 125 percent. 
Similarly, regional regressions indicate that TFPs in Africa vary widely, up to 140 percent 
around the mean, whereas for all other regions such variation stays within 8 percent of the mean. 
Thus, including African and low-income countries with other countries in the world under the 
assumption that individual country intercepts summarize most of the nonrandom differences may 
grossly misrepresent reality.  
The following section provides details of the production function estimates and a 
description of our calculated series for total factor productivity. Section 3 explains total factor 
productivity for each country group and geographic location and considers how important 
external and internal factors may influence the growth of total factor productivity around the 
world. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Estimates of the Production Function and Total Factor Productivity 
The Production Function 
We estimate important parameters of production functions and calculate our series for total 
factor productivity from the Cobb-Douglas function specification on three sets of data---panel 
data for all countries, panel data separated by income category (low, middle and high), and panel 
data on geographic regions (Africa, Asia+, Europe+, and Latin America). 
The Cobb-Douglas production function is written as follows: 
(1)  Y = A Kα Lβ,  0 < α < 1 and 0 < β < 1, 
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where Y equals real GDP, K equals the total physical capital stock, L equals the number of 
workers (labor force), and A equals an index of total factor productivity. We allow for the 
possibility of non-constant returns to scale by not restricting (α + β) to equal one.  
Dividing equation (1) by the labor force (L) expresses output, and the physical capital 
stock on a per worker basis. That is, 
(2)  y = A kα Lα+β−1, 
where y equals real GDP per worker, and k equals the per worker stock of physical capital. 
Those production functions display increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale as α+β is 
greater than, equal to, or less than one, respectively. 
Rewriting equation (2) in natural logarithms yields the following: 
(3)  lny = lnA + α lnk + (α + β − 1) lnL.  
Thus, the tests for constant returns to scale involve whether the coefficient of lnL equals zero. 
Including human capital as an input in the production function proves controversial. 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) advocate such an approach on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds. In a model that is more comparable to our framework because of the use of panel data, 
however, Islam (1995) finds that human capital does not contribute significantly to explaining 
output in the Mankiw-Romer-Weil specification. Miller and Upadhyay (2000), however, do find 
a significant role for human capital in their estimations. In what follows, we include human 
capital in a second-stage model that studies total factor productivity. 
Panel Data and Fixed-Effects Estimation 
Our panel data cover the 1960 to 1989 time period (1959 to 1989 for any growth rate) for a 
sample of 83 countries in the full data set. The Data Appendix, Table A, lists the countries 
included in our sample. Our panel combines data in five-year blocks as follows: 1960-64, 1965-
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69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, and 1985-89. Usually, data series reflect averages of the 
information over five years in each block. Our data encompasses 498 observations (83 countries 
and 6 time blocks).3 Our estimating equation emerges by adding a random error to equation (3). 
This error term incorporates the effects of omitted variables. Classical regression analysis 
assumes that the omitted variables are independent of the included right-hand-side variables and 
are independently, identically distributed.  
When using panel data, however, we can further classify the omitted variables into three 
groups -- country-varying and time-invariant, time-varying and country-invariant, and country- 
and time-varying variables (see Hsiao, 1986 or Greene, 1997). The country-varying time-
invariant variables differ across countries, but are constant within a country over time. The time-
varying, country-invariant variables, such as technological shocks, differ over time but are 
constant at a point in time across countries. Finally, country- and time-varying variables differ 
across both countries and time. 
The estimation of equation (3) without consideration of possible country-specific or time-
specific effects can generate misleading results for ordinary-least-squares regressions. Problems 
emerge when either the unobservable country-specific or time-specific variables correlate with 
the included right-hand-side variables. Two alternative, but related, procedures exist for 
addressing these problems -- fixed-effect and random-effect models. We restrict our attention to 
fixed-effect estimation since the random-effects estimation requires that the omitted variables are 
uncorrelated with the included right-hand-side variables -- an unrealistic assumption in the 
context of our model. 
                                                          
3 For details of data, see Miller and Upadhyay (2000). 
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If the problem omits country-specific variables, we perform the regression after adjusting 
all variables by subtracting their respective means over time. Since the unobserved country-
specific variables and the intercept do not change over time, such an adjustment drops these 
variables out of the regression equations. On the other hand, if the problem omits time-specific 
variables that correlate with the included right-hand-side variables, subtracting the mean over 
countries drops the intercept and the time-specific effects out of the regression. The revised 
regression equation in each case provides unbiased and consistent estimates.  
Finally, when both country- and time-specific effects correlate with the included right-
hand-side variables, we adjust for the means over countries and time. We adopt this last 
approach and consider fixed effects over countries and time. Our problem, however, has few 
elements in the time dimension. Thus, we directly include the six time-specific dummy variables, 
one for each period, and only adjust the data to avoid using 83 country dummy variables. 
The estimating equation is as follows: 
(4)  lny = lnA + α lnk + (α + β − 1) lnL, +  θi timei + ε, i=∑ 16
where timei (i = 1, ..., 6) represent the time dummy variables and the variables for each country 
measure deviations from their country means over time. We then calculate the country-specific 
fixed effects of intercepts (cintj) as follows: 
(5)  cintj = ln y j - $α ln k j - 1 $δ ln L j , 
where "-" over a variable implies the mean of that variable, "^" over a parameter means the 
estimate of that parameter, δ1 = (α + β - 1) in (4), and j = {1,2,3,...} is the index across 
countries. Note that the time-specific fixed effects appear directly as the respective coefficients 
of the time dummy variables. 
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Production Function Estimates: All Countries 
The estimate of the Cobb-Douglas function (equation 4) for the full-panel data set yields the 
following results: 
(6)  ln y = 0.4756 lnk - 0.0988 lnLit +  ∑  θi timei + εt . i=16
            (18.86)        (-1.32)   
  R2 = .7860 SEE = .1269   F(7,407) = 218.26 N = 498 
The coefficient of ln L (i.e., -0.0988), although only significant at the 20-percent level, indicates 
that the production function exhibits slightly decreasing returns to scale. The coefficient of ln k 
assigns a value of 0.4756 to the elasticity of output with respect to the physical capital stock. 
These two coefficients combine to generate the implied elasticity of output with respect to the 
labor force of 0.4256. Thus, after accounting for country- and time-specific effects, the output 
elasticities with respect to labor and physical capital sum to a value of 0.9012, indicating a 
slightly decreasing returns to scale.4 
Our dataset includes observations for 30 years for each country. Each data point, 
however, averages 5 yearly observations. Thus, we only have a short panel on the time 
dimension (six 5-year periods for each country), and hence autocorrelation is not of much 
concern. On the other hand, heterogeneity of countries in the panel along both the income and 
locational scales can cause the residual terms to be heteroscedastic. Using the Lagrange 
multiplier test for the Cobb-Douglas function, however, we find that the statistic equals only 
0.021 with a high significance level of 0.88. Thus, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
constant variances across countries.  
                                                          
4 The estimated θis, not reported, are available on request. 
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Production Function Estimates: Income Levels and Geographic Regions 
Another way to test for possible differences in technology divides the sample into groups of 
countries in different ways. We use two methods to create sub-samples for more intensive study. 
First, we divide our sample into low-, middle-, and high-income countries based on real GDP per 
worker for two different periods: 1960-64, and 1970s. The categorization based on 1960-64 
incomes allows one to study subsequent growth in originally similarly placed economies and 
convergence during the sample period. Technological differences among income groups for the 
entire 30-year period, however, can perhaps better discriminate, if we classify countries 
according to their income levels during the 1970s, the middle of the three decades in our sample. 
That is especially desirable if rapid growth elevates countries from low- to middle-income or 
from middle- to the high-income groups over our entire sample period. 
The World Bank divides countries into low-, middle-, and high-income groups based on 
real GDP per capita. Using a number in the range of 2 to 2.5 to measure the ratio of population to 
labor force, we convert these ranges into ranges based on real GDP per worker. Thus, our 
classification based on 1960-64 incomes fixes $3,000 (in constant 1985 international prices) as 
the threshold GDP per worker between low- and middle-income countries and $10,000 per 
worker between middle- and high-income countries. For the classification based on incomes 
during the 1970s, an analogous exercise leads to $4,000 and $13,500 as the respective cutoffs for 
GDP per worker.5 
Second, geography provides another important dimension along which to split our 
sample. Countries in Africa may use a level of technology that significantly differs from that 
used in Europe. Our regional sub-samples mostly follow continental divisions, except that we 
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include Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. in Europe+, and Fiji and Papua New 
Guinea in Asia+. 
In sum, we divide the full-sample into three different subsamples. The first subsample 
segregates countries based on real GDP per capita – low-, medium-, and high-income -- using 
1960-64 data. The second subsample also segregates based on real GDP per capita, but now 
using 1970s data. The third subsample segregates based on geography – Africa, Asia+, Europe+, 
and Latin America. Table 1 reports F-tests of the null-hypothesis that we can pool the data across 
income groups or geography, Those F-tests clearly reject the null-hypothesis, indicating that the 
subsample production function estimates differ significantly from each other.6 
The results for the estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production functions appear in Table 
1. Several noteworthy points emerge. Starting with income categories, we find that the elasticity 
of output with respect to capital in high-income countries falls substantially below that in other 
countries. This elasticity equals 0.17 for high-income countries when grouped by incomes for 
1960-64, and rises to 0.31 for the same subset when we reclassify countries according to the 
1970s' incomes. That increase traces to the movement of Japan and Ireland from the middle- to 
high-income group. We also find significantly decreasing returns to scale for high-income 
countries, as the output elasticities with respect to capital and labor sum to only about 0.5. 
Second, we find a close similarity of results for middle- and low-income groups across 
our two income classifications. In particular, the middle-income group fairly well represents the 
entire sample in terms of key results. The returns to scale for the middle-income countries 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 We use the ratios of cutoff incomes and average incomes for 1960-64 in the previous procedure, and the average 
incomes for the 1970s, 
6 Similar F-tests where we consider whether one subsample (e.g., low-income countries) possesses production 
functions that differ significantly from a production function for the rest of the world (e.g., medium- and high-
income countries) always imply that the production functions differ. 
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matches closely that for the whole set of countries. The combined elasticity of output with 
respect to capital and labor equals 0.82 for the middle-income group and equals 0.91 for all 83 
countries. That comparability of the middle-income group with the world as a whole reflects a 
higher output elasticity with respect to capital (0.57 versus 0.48 for the entire sample) largely 
offset by a lower elasticity with respect to labor (0.25 versus 0.43). 
The similarity of results, however, does not carry through to countries on either side of 
the income scale. Although the capital elasticity of output does not change that much (0.46 
versus 0.48), the labor elasticity of output is much higher for the low-income countries (1.34 
versus 0.43). Those values indicate that the production function exhibits significantly increasing 
returns to scale for low-income countries in sharp contrast, as discussed above, to the decreasing 
returns to scale for the high-income subset. That result, therefore, highlights the potential for 
convergence in income per worker between rich and poor countries. Focusing on our division of 
countries into income groups based on incomes for 1960-64, if low-income countries, on 
average, experience increasing returns to scale in production during the next 25-30 years, we 
expect incomes to converge and a number of countries in the sample possibly to move up the 
income distribution.7 
Another way to explore for possible differences in technology separates countries into 
geographic regions (Frankel and Romer, 1999). The findings for our four regions show 
significant similarity in key parameters, except for Africa. The scale elasticity for Asia, Europe, 
and Latin America lies between 0.95 (Europe) and 1.08 (Latin America) whereas the elasticity 
for Africa equals 1.70, and closely follows the elasticity of 1.80 for low-income countries in our 
                                                          
7 We study convergence in income and total factor productivity among the same set of countries as in our current 
sample in an associated paper (Miller and Upadhyay, 2002). In that paper, we find, however, stronger evidence of 
absolute convergence in total factor productivity than in income. 
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earlier analysis. The elasticities of output with respect to capital alone are, however, more 
comparable for all groups since they range between 0.37 for Asia and 0.54 for Europe with the 
intermediate values assumed of 0.45 for Africa and 0.51 for Latin America. 
In sum, we find evidence of increasing returns to scale for low-income and African 
countries, although these two sub-samples do not exactly overlap. Several Asian and Latin 
American countries appear in the low-income category, and several African countries appear in 
the middle-income category. Middle- and high-income countries display decreasing returns to 
scale whereas countries from Asia, Europe, and Latin America indicate a scale elasticity close to 
unity, ranging from slightly decreasing (0.95) for Europe to slightly increasing (1.08) for Latin 
America. Thus, we do find evidence of technological differences across groups of countries 
despite the fact that we limit our attention to a single Cobb-Douglas specification of the 
production function.8  
As a final check, we calculate the correlation coefficient between the series for total 
factor productivity based on the pooled regression for the entire sample and the combined series 
for total factor productivity based on the separate estimates for income groups. The rank 
correlation coefficient between these two estimates of total factor productivity equals 0.74, 
which is far from perfect but not so low as to suggest no relationship.9 
 The findings from our sub-sample Cobb-Douglas production function regressions for the 
income and geographic groups raises at least two important questions that deserve further 
                                                          
8 Inclusion of human capital in an augmented production function is another approach to study growth and total 
factor productivity. For reasons and results discussed in a companion paper (Miller and Upadhyay, 2000), we do not 
pursue this approach here.  
9 If, instead, we omit the low income countries, either definition, or the African countries, and calculate TFP 
numbers from pooled regressions absent the low-income or African countries, then the correlation between the TFP 
numbers for the pooled versus the series for TFP gotten from the separate regressions equal 0.95, 0.96, and 0.99 for 
the omission of 1960-64 low income, 1970s low income, and African countries, respectively. 
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discussion.10 First, if low-income and African countries exhibit increasing returns to scale, then 
why do we not observe the convergence of real GDP per capita? Several points relate to this 
question. The low-income and African countries did not experience the growth in their capital 
stocks that other country groups experienced. For example, capital stock per worker rose 
annually during 1960-64 - 1985-89 by only 2.6 percent per year (25 years) for Africa as 
compared to 2.9 percent for Latin America, 3.8 percent for Europe, and 4.3 percent for Asia. The 
slower growth rate is all the more unfortunate because of the small capital base that they started 
with in 1960. Thus, lack of convergence significantly relates to lack of capital accumulation 
along the production frontier. If low-income and African economies could accumulate capital 
faster, then the convergence process could start. In the 1990s, although not addressed in our 
paper, non-convergence between Africa and rest of the world was even more striking due to civil 
wars, lack of institution building, and limited foreign direct investment in many countries of our 
sample. In other words, we argue that the lack of growth of factors of production helped to retard 
progress in the low-income and African countries.  
The negative movement in total factor productivity in many low-income and African 
countries for most periods also provided an important further drag on growth and convergence. 
On average, total factor productivity decreased monotonically over our sample period for low-
income and African countries. Further, the previously mentioned propensity for civil wars and 
lack of institution building probably plays a dramatic role in total factor productivity movements. 
Thus, the slow growth of capital in Africa and negative total factor productivity movements did 
not allow those countries to exploit higher returns to scale in production and to induce 
convergence of per capita income. 
                                                          
10 Editor Johnson first raised these questions after he read our initial submission to the journal. 
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 Second, given that high-income countries exhibit decreasing returns to scale, how did 
those countries continue to increase real GDP per capita? Here, the conventional wisdom holds 
that the growth in total factor productivity provides a most important contribution to economic 
growth (e.g., Islam, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2001). But, Young (1994) 
offers a contrarian view that factor accumulation and not total factor productivity growth 
explained economic growth in East-Asian countries. 
3. Determinants of Total Factor Productivity 
The basic characteristics of the different total factor productivity estimates from our model in the 
last section appear in Table 2. We find that for the low-income group, the mean of the natural 
logarithm of TFP per worker is negative and the coefficients of variation show a high degree of 
dispersion. In the regional classification, Africa displays similar characteristics, with a negative 
mean and high dispersion in the natural logarithm of TFP. For the middle- and high-income 
countries and those outside Africa, the natural logarithm of TFPs more closely cluster around 
their respective means.  
The Basic Equation 
In this section, we examine the role of both domestic and external variables in influencing total 
factor productivity. Our estimate proceeds with the following equation for total factor 
productivity: 
(7)  ln tfp = a1 + a2 ln H + a3 ln open + a4 ln tot + a5 ln pd + a6 ln (1+π)  
   + a7 ln σx + a8 ln σtot + a9 ln σpd + a10 ln σπ + i=∑ 16 a10+i timei + ε, 
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where open equals the ratio of exports to GDP or total trade to GDP,11 tot equals the terms of 
trade, pd equals local price deviation from purchasing power parity, π equals the inflation rate,12 
and σi equals the standard deviation of i (= x, tot, pd, and π) over the five-year sub-periods. 
Once again, we estimate equation (7) using the fixed-effects method.  
Our main goal in this section considers how variables representing the performance of 
the external sector relate to total factor productivity, and how our results for countries in 
different income and locational groups compare with the results for the entire sample. We 
suppress the results for the time dummies from Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
Table 3 reports the results of our estimates of equation (7) for the pooled sample and for 
countries at different levels of development based on the 1960-64 average incomes. The values 
for the TFP variable come from the Cobb-Douglas production function discussed in the last 
section. Starting with the external sector of the economy, the variables related to trade show a 
generally positive effect on total factor productivity. Openness exhibits a significant positive 
effect generally at the 1-percent level for all samples. Greater openness enhances growth of the 
economy through a larger total factor productivity.  
The local price deviation from purchasing power parity displays a significant negative 
effect at the 5-percent level in the full sample. Here, larger deviations from purchasing power 
parity associate with lower total factor productivity. To the extent that local deviations from 
purchasing power parity imply a more-restricted, less-open domestic economy, the coefficient on 
this variable captures another aspect of the openness of the economy to trade, reinforcing our 
finding on the export-GDP ratio. The price deviation variable, however, loses its statistical 
                                                          
11 Although we considered both export-GDP ratio and total trade (imports plus exports) to GDP ratio as our 
measures of openness, the export-to-GDP measure of openness consistently performed better. 
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significance in income sub-samples and only retains its negative sign for the middle-income 
group.  
The terms of trade possesses the expected positive effect in the full sample, but is only 
significant at the 20-percent level. So improvements in the terms of trade weakly associate with 
higher total factor productivity. Once again, however, this result seems driven solely by 
countries in the middle-income range. For other groups, the coefficients exhibit a statistically 
insignificant negative sign, even at the 20-percent level. 
For the domestic variables, human capital exerts an insignificant, albeit positive, effect 
on TFP while inflation exerts a significant negative effect at the 1-percent level. Human capital 
turns significant for the middle-income group alone, and that too at the 10-percent level. We get 
greater consistency for the inflation effect, as most income classifications indicate a highly 
significant negative effects of inflation on total factor productivity. For the high-income 
countries, however, it loses its statistical significance and reverses sign. On average, the inflation 
rate for the high-income group falls well below the 20 percent or so beyond which, according to 
some studies, inflation begins impinging on growth (Bruno and Easterly, 1998 and Gylfason and 
Herbertsson, 2001). That finding that higher inflation associates with lower total factor 
productivity may explain the observed empirical regularity between higher inflation and lower 
economic growth.13 That is, higher inflation leads to lower economic growth through its effect on 
total factor productivity. 
The volatility variables (as measured by standard deviations) have, on average, much less 
significance in explaining total factor productivity. The one exception, the standard deviation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 We add 1 to actual inflation to avoid taking logs of negative inflation rates. 
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exports to GDP, exhibits a significant negative effect at the 1-percent level. That is, lower export 
instability associates with higher total factor productivity. This is true of the overall sample and 
of the low-, middle-, and high-income countries, although the coefficients are much less 
significant or insignificant for low-income countries. For the low-income group, the volatility 
coefficients are unexpectedly positive and statistically significant. 
In sum, higher and more stable openness and a lower inflation rate associate with higher 
total factor productivity. The results for the whole sample do not in general extend to component 
income groups. In particular, the price deviation from purchasing power parity and the terms of 
trade do not behave in a predictable fashion across country classifications. This suggests that 
lumping countries at various levels of development together in an empirical growth study may 
not succeed in uncovering important policy implications. 
Human Capital-Openness Interaction 
Human capital effects do not emerge in our simple specification of the determinants of total 
factor productivity. Human capital may affect total factor productivity through its interaction 
with trade orientation.14 Greater openness fosters competition, encourages the use of modern 
technology, increases the demand for high-skilled labor, and promotes learning by doing. 
Countries Grouped by Income 
Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 in Table 3 add the interaction term between the human capital and 
openness variables. We find that markedly different results between two identical TFP 
regressions but for different TFP series---one estimated using a production function for the entire 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 While Levine and Renelt (1992) find that the effect of inflation on economic growth is fragile, they do find that it 
is consistently negative. Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Grier and Tullock (1989), and Miller and Russek (1997), 
among others, report evidence of a negative effect of inflation on economic growth. 
 18
sample of countries as in Miller and Upadhyay (2000, p.416) and the other based on a production 
function for each sub-sample as explained in the last section. 
Human capital now exerts a significantly positive direct effect on total factor productivity 
at 10 percent level for middle- and high-income countries and a significantly negative direct 
effect for the low-income countries. In another major change, openness exhibits a significant 
negative effect on total factor productivity in low-income countries. Only the interaction term's 
coefficient is both positive and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that low-income 
economies benefit from a concerted growth of human capital and openness but not necessarily 
from the development of one or the other in isolation. For middle-income countries, the direct 
effects of openness and human capital are positive but openness fails to interact with human 
capital to exert a positive influence on total factor productivity. For high-income countries, the 
direct effects of openness and human capital are positive and now openness interacts with human 
capital to reduce total factor productivity. 
Other factors including the terms of trade, local price deviation, and domestic inflation do 
not discernibly change in the way they affect total factor productivity in the specification that 
includes the interaction term. 
The findings for total factor productivity regressions classified by income during the 
1970s yield no remarkable differences in results from those for countries grouped by 1960-64 
income (see Table 4). 
Countries Grouped by Geography: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 Grossman and Helpman (1991) suggest that increased trade orientation may interact with human capital to 
produce higher output growth. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) interact human capital with other variables including 
technological progress. Miller and Upadhyay (2000) employ a similar specification. 
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We do find interesting results when we consider total factor productivity regressions for 
geographical regions. The TFP series are based on a production function estimated separately for 
each region. The following paragraphs discuss the results for estimating equation (7) with and 
without the interaction between human capital and openness (see Table 5).  
Similar findings emerge for African and low-income countries, because many countries 
appear in both sub-samples. But the results are by no means the same. For Africa, human capital 
does not affect total factor productivity, if we exclude the interaction term, whereas it displays a 
significantly negative effect if we include it. Openness, in turn, changes from having a 
significantly positive to a significantly negative effect on TFP for Africa when the interaction 
term appears. Much like low-income countries discussed in the preceding subsection, Africa 
experiences a significant (and larger) positive effect on its total factor productivity when human 
capital and openness interact with each other. The interaction term soaks away some of the direct 
positive effect of openness on total factor productivity. 
Latin America displays similar characteristics in terms of the effects of human capital, 
openness, and the interaction between the two. In particular, the specification that includes the 
interaction term yields a negative coefficient for both human capital and openness.  
For Asia, we do not find much evidence of a significant relation between any of these 
variables and total factor productivity. This is a bit surprising when we see many other studies 
indicating a close positive correlation between openness and growth in Asia, particularly East 
and Southeast Asia.15 On the other hand, deviations of local prices from purchasing power parity 
exerts a significant negative effect on total factor productivity in Asia, but in no other region. 
                                                          
15 See Pack and Page (1994), for example. Note, however, that Asia includes South Asia and other regions where 
the role of trade exhibits a less important role than in East Asia. 
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Interestingly, Asia is the sole region where PPP deviation and volatility in the terms of trade 
possess consistently negative effects. 
Finally, domestic inflation does not significantly influence TFP in any region outside of 
Africa, although as noted in the last subsection, negative effects of inflation exist for the whole 
sample of countries as well as for the low- and middle-income groups.  
Openness and Human Capital Effects with Interaction Terms 
Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Tables 3, 4, and 5 report the results after including the openness-human 
capital interaction term. The effects of openness and human capital on total factor productivity 
depend now on the values of human capital and openness, respectively. For example, the all-
countries regression reports coefficients of –0.0961, 0.0925, and 0.0395, respectively. So the 
effect of human capital on total factor productivity depends on the value of openness and the 
effect of openness on total factor productivity depends on human capital. More formerly, the 
total coefficient on human capital equals (-0.0961 + 0.0395 lnx) and the total coefficient on 
openness equals (0.0925 + 0.0395 lnH). Now, as human capital increases, the effect of openness 
on total factor productivity remains positive and gets larger. As openness increases, on the other 
hand, the effect of human capital on total factor productivity gets less negative. In fact, the effect 
switches to a positive effect when exports exceed 11.4 percent of GDP. See Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
Now consider the results for the low-income, African, and Latin American regressions 
that sing a similar song. More openness, ignoring the interaction term, associates with lower total 
factor productivity. The interaction term, however, shows that increasing human capital causes 
the negative effect to diminish in magnitude, and flips the overall sign positive when ln H 
exceeds 7.4, 7.0, 6.7, and 5.7 for the 1960-64 income, 1970s income, African, and Latin 
American regressions, respectively. For the low-income and African countries, those values fall 
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within the actual sample range. But, for the Latin American countries, the sample range fully 
exceeds the switching value. That is, the combined effect of openness in Latin America always 
exceeds zero. Further, higher human capital, ignoring the interaction term, associates with lower 
total factor productivity. Now, more openness can reverse that negative relationship when 
exports exceed 6.2, 7.5, 9.7, and 57.4 percent of GDP for the 1960-64 income, 1970s income, 
African, and Latin American regressions, respectively. Although the openness thresholds lie 
within the openness ranges in each case, they fall much closer to the lower end of the range for 
the low-income and African countries and much nearer the high end of the range for the Latin 
American countries. Thus, low income and African countries more likely experience a negative 
correlation between human capital and total factor productivity while Latin American countries 
more likely face a positive correlation. Those results also appear in Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
The middle-income and Asian regressions do not possess significant coefficients for 
openness, human capital, and their interaction term. Thus, no story exists concerning the effects 
of human capital and/or openness. 
Finally, the high-income and European regressions also tell similar stories, but stories 
that reverse those of the low-income, African, and Latin American regressions. More openness, 
ignoring the interaction term, associates with higher total factor productivity. Then higher human 
capital reduces that positive linkage, and flips the overall sign negative when ln H exceeds 12.8, 
13.0, and 10.2 for the 1960-64 income, 1970s income, and European regressions, respectively. In 
each case, the value of ln H that switches the overall coefficient negative lies within the sample 
range, although at the upper end of that range. That is, countries with high levels of human 
capital may experience a decrease in total factor productivity with an increase in openness. High 
human capital countries may reflect the technological innovators and more openness may lead to 
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greater leakages of that technology to the rest of the world.16 Further, higher human capital, 
ignoring the interaction term, associates with higher total factor productivity. Then more 
openness reduces that positive linkage, and reverses the sign when exports exceed 16.4, 15.8, 
and 36.1 percent of GDP for the 1960-64 income, the 1970s income, and the European 
regressions. Although the openness thresholds lie within the openness ranges, they fall nearer the 
lower end of the range for high-income countries and closer to the upper end of the range for 
European countries. Once again, refer to Tables 6, 7, and 8. 
4. Conclusion 
We study the effects of openness, trade orientation, and human capital on total factor 
productivity for a pooled cross-section, time-series panel data set of developed and developing 
countries. We first estimate multiple sets of total factor productivity based on Cobb-Douglas 
production function and the fixed-effect regression technique, involving output per worker, 
capital per worker, and the labor force. We classify countries along income and geography. 
Then, we search for the possible determinants of total factor productivity, with special emphasis 
on variables reflecting trade orientation and human capital. 
Our results show that giving the economy a greater outward orientation benefits total 
factor productivity in general but not necessarily for specific classes of countries. We capture 
outward orientation through the export-GDP ratio, the terms of trade, and alignment of local 
prices with purchasing power parity. Among other variables, human capital expansion fails to 
have an independent positive effect on total factor productivity growth except for Europe.17  
                                                          
16 For the classifications based on income, only the U.S. and then Japan and the U.S. exceed the human-capital 
threshold level. For the European country classification, 15 of the 25 countries, including Japan and the U.S., 
exceed the human-capital threshold value. 
17 'Europe' in this paper also includes Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the U. S. 
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Even openness fails to elicit a significant positive effect on total factor productivity in all 
cases. That is, openness without the interaction term does contribute positively to total factor 
productivity for all country groups. But, including the interaction term causes the low-income, 
African, and Latin American countries to see a negative effect, excluding the positive effect of 
the interaction term. That positive effect of the interaction term can switch the overall sign to a 
positive value if the stock of human capital exceeds the threshold level. In addition, the 
interaction term for the high-income and European countries contributes negatively to the effect 
of openness and can switch the overall effect to a negative one if the openness value exceeds the 
threshold.  
Similarly, the interaction between human capital and openness does not positively 
influence total factor productivity for several country groups. Absent the interaction term, human 
capital generally does not achieve significance, except for the positive effect in the middle-
income countries. Including the interaction term causes the effect of human capital by itself to 
become negative in low-income, African, and Latin American countries, while positive for high-
income countries. The interaction term can cause the overall effect to turn positive for the low-
income, African, and Latin American countries if the openness exceeds the threshold level. 
Further, the interaction term’s negative effect in high-income and European countries can 
reverse the positive effect of human capital by itself if the openness exceeds the threshold level. 
Inflation, the other domestic variable, has a significant negative effect on total factor 
productivity in low-and medium-income countries, but not in high-income countries. In addition, 
that negative effect only occurs for Africa in the sub-samples based on geography. 
Finally, even though a strong positive influence of outward orientation on growth 
through total factor productivity possesses obvious implications for policy, we conclude with a 
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strong word of caution. Two sources of problems in our results and those in almost all empirical 
papers concern the following. While our dataset incorporates much digging into new and old 
sources and includes enormous cross-referencing, it still does not reflect the best possible 
quality. The policy implications, therefore, need further empirical investigation given better data. 
Second, the production function choice for a given country or group of countries is not yet fully 
resolved. In a companion paper, we consider outward orientation using translog and constant 
elasticity of substitution production function specifications. But, the enormous differences in 
results for country groups even within the Cobb-Douglas function as analyzed in this paper 
provide striking evidence. We, therefore, conclude that a large sample of countries included in a 
single panel model may yield incorrect policy implications for any given country about the 
effects of outward orientation, human capital, or inflation. Using a smaller sample of countries 
with strong similarity of characteristics probably holds much greater promise. 
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Table 1: Production Function Estimates by Income Level and Region 
        (Cobb-Douglas) 
 
 Coef. of ln k Coef. of ln L RTS 2R  
All Countries 0.4756* 
(18.86) 
-0.0988‡‡ 
(-1.32) 
0.912: DRS 0.786 
 
Countries Grouped by 1960-64 Income Per Worker: 
F(16, 391) = 9.45* 
High-Income 0.1683** 
(2.30) 
−0.5114* 
(−5.43) 
0.489: DRS 0.816 
Middle-Income 0.5694* 
(12.72) 
−0.1719‡‡ 
(−1.49) 
0.822: DRS 0.827 
Low-Income 0.4604* 
(13.68) 
0.7953* 
(3.62) 
1.795: IRS 0.779 
 
Countries Grouped by 1970s Income Per Worker: 
F(16, 391) = 4.52* 
High-Income 0.3096* 
(5.14) 
−0.4824* 
(−5.12) 
0.518: DRS 0.839 
Middle-Income 0.6068* 
(13.48) 
−0.1785‡‡ 
(−1.45) 
0.821: DRS 0.830 
Low-Income 0.4309* 
(12.56) 
0.6548 
(3.01) 
1.655: IRS 0.748 
 
Countries Grouped by Geographic Region: 
F(24, 383) = 11.66* 
Africa 0.4452* 
(12.06) 
0.7041* 
(2.52) 
1.7041: IRS 0.763 
Asia+ 0.3657* 
(5.70) 
0.0124 
(0.05) 
1.0124: IRS 0.783 
Europe+ 0.5408* 
(8.43) 
−0.0486 
(−0.33) 
0.951: DRS 0.908 
Latin America 0.5112* 
(7.93) 
0.0807 
(0.54) 
1.081: IRS 0.916 
Note: All regressions employ the fixed-effect technique for countries. The 
regressions explicitly include 6 time dummies to capture the fixed effects over 
time (not reported here). RTS indicates the returns to scale (constant, 
increasing, or decreasing). 
2
R  equals the adjusted coefficient of 
determination. The F-test considers the null-hypothesis that each subgrouping 
possesses the same production function. 
 
* means significant at the 1-percent level. 
** means significant at the 5-percent level. 
‡ means significant at the 10-percent level. 
‡‡ means significant at the 20-percent level. 
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Table 2: Basic Statistics on Real GDP Per Worker and TFP Per Worker by Country Groups 
Logarithm of Real GDP Per Worker  Logarithm of TFP Per Worker 
Countries Grouped by 1960-64 Income  Countries Grouped by 1960-64 Income 
 Mean Std. Dev. Coef.Var.   Mean Std. Dev. Coeff.Var.
Low 7.662 0.522 6.809 Low -2.182 1.212 55.550
Middle 8.948 0.427 4.769 Middle 5.223 0.369 7.062
High 9.934 0.279 2.812 High 12.578 0.822 6.532
All 8.880 0.939 10.570 All: Separatea 5.298 5.497 103.743
   All: Pooledb 5.536 0.434 7.840
Countries Grouped by 1970s Income  Countries Grouped by 1970s Income 
 Mean Std. Dev. Coeff.Var.   Mean Std. Dev. Coeff.Var.
Low 7.645 0.482 6.303 Low -0.789 0.988 125.183
Middle 8.928 0.406 4.545 Middle 4.946 0.369 7.454
High 9.899 0.310 3.135 High 10.882 0.778 7.145
All 8.880 0.939 10.570 All: Separatea 5.214 4.449 85.340
   All: Pooledb 5.536 0.434 7.840
Countries Grouped by Geographic Region  Countries Grouped by Geographic Region 
 Mean Std. Dev. Coeff.Var.   Mean Std. Dev. Coeff.Var.
Africa 7.826 0.756 9.661 Africa -0.630 0.880 139.727
Asia+ 8.692 0.711 8.180 Asia+ 5.509 0.441 7.997
Europe+ 9.732 0.506 5.198 Europe+ 4.702 0.221 4.700
L. Amer. 8.969 0.578 6.448 L. Amer. 3.889 0.229 5.891
All 8.880 0.939 10.570 All: Separatea 3.431 2.336 68.079
   All: Pooledb 5.536 0.434 7.840
 
a Results for all countries are combined after performing regressions separately. 
b Results for all countries are from the single pooled regression. 
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Table 3: Total Factor Productivity Regressions 
  (income categories based on 1960-64 average income) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
       lntfp (all 83 countries)_        lntfp (22 low-income)     lntfp (38 middle-income)_       lntfp (23 high-income)__       
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
lnH     0.0090  -0.0961‡‡     0.0452   -0.1041‡   0.0905‡    0.1246‡      0.0113     0.1805‡ 
    (0.29)  (-1.64)      (1.03)    (-1.98)    (1.83)      (1.86)       (0.20)      (1.93) 
lnx     0.1237*    0.0925*     0.1040*   -0.4192*   0.0936**    0.2052‡‡      0.1923*     0.8285* 
    (6.08)    (3.70)      (3.66)    (-3.45)    (2.44)      (1.34)       (3.50)      (2.87) 
lnH lnx      0.0395**     0.0569*        -0.0133            -0.0645** 
      (2.12)       (4.41)        (-0.75)        (-2.24) 
lntot     0.0283‡‡    0.0286‡‡   -0.0163   -0.0325   0.0748*    0.0762*      0.0366     0.0369 
    (1.38)    (1.40)     (-0.40)    (-0.87)    (2.69)      (2.73)       (0.78)      (0.81) 
lnpd    -0.0703**   -0.0821**    0.0504   -0.0129  -0.0476    -0.0514      0.0183    -0.0090 
     (-2.03)   (-2.35)    (0.87)     (-0.24)   (-0.72)     (-0.77)       (0.24)      (-0.12) 
ln(1+π )   -0.1550*   -0.1560*   -0.1033**   -0.0972**  -0.2576**    -0.2498**      0.1506     0.0751 
     (-3.78)   (-3.82)    (-2.02)    (-2.07)   (-2.45)     (-2.36)       (1.16)      (0.57) 
σx    -0.0023*   -0.0028*   -0.0083‡‡   -0.0015  -0.0023*    -0.0023*     -0.0033**    -0.0037 
    (-3.14)   (-3.65)    (-1.33)    (-0.25)   (-2.63)     (-2.70)      (-2.18)     (-2.48)** 
σtot     0.00003    0.00004    0.0029**   0.0040*  -0.0001    -0.0001     -0.0017    -0.0009 
    (0.23)    (0.30)     (2.29)     (3.31)    (-0.68)     (-0.68)      (-0.71)     (-0.38) 
σpd     0.0006‡‡    0.0008‡    0.0008‡   0.0011*  -0.0002    -0.0003     -0.0027‡    -0.0025‡‡ 
    (1.60)    (1.94)     (1.76)     (2.63)    (-0.22)     (-0.24)      (-1.52)     (-1.43) 
σπ     0.0116‡‡    0.0117‡‡   -0.0029   -0.0063   0.0346‡    0.0331     -0.0399**    -0.0313‡ 
    (1.33)    (1.35)     (-0.16)    (-0.39)    (1.95)      (1.85)‡      (-2.16)     (-1.70) 
 
R
_ 2
     0.3040    0.3101   0.6880  0.7387  0.3444   0.3427      0.8505     0.8573 
SEE     0.1166    0.1161   0.1131  0.1034  0.1139   0.1141      0.0922     0.0901 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
Note: The dependent variable, in each case, is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity. Other variables are defined as follows: x is the export-GDP ratio; tot is the 
terms of trade; pd is the local price deviation from purchasing power parity; π is the inflation rate; d75 equals zero in 1960-64, 1965-69, and 1970-74 and equals one in 
1975-79, 1080-84, and 1985-89; and σi equals the standard deviation of i = x, tot, pd, and π over each 5-year sub-period. Moreover, just like the time dummy variables 
(results suppressed in this table), d75 is not adjusted for its mean in the fixed-effect estimation. 
 
* significant at the 1-percent level;  ** significant at the 5-percent level. 
‡ significant at the 10-percent level;  ‡‡ significant at the 20-percent level. 
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Table 4: Total Factor Productivity Regressions 
  (income categories based on 1970s average income) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
       lntfp (all 83 countries)__       lntfp (22 low-income)     lntfp (36 middle-income)_       lntfp (25 high-income)__       
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
lnH     0.0090  -0.0961‡‡     0.0247   -0.1210**   0.0814‡‡    0.1239‡      0.0024     0.1550‡ 
    (0.29)  (-1.64)      (0.57)    (-2.29)    (1.61)      (1.75)       (0.05)      (0.07) 
lnx     0.1237*    0.0925*     0.0942*   -0.4215*   0.0700**    0.1940‡‡      0.1771*     0.7266* 
    (6.08)    (3.70)      (2.73)    (-3.35)    (2.22)      (1.31)       (3.53)      (2.84) 
lnH lnx      0.0395**      0.0600*        -0.0135            -0.0561** 
      (2.12)       (4.24)        (-0.86)        (-2.19) 
lntot     0.0283‡‡    0.0286‡‡   -0.0151   -0.0372   0.0708**    0.0696**      0.0108     0.0063 
    (1.38)    (1.40)     (-0.37)    (-0.98)    (2.52)      (2.47)       (0.25)      (0.15) 
lnpd    -0.0703**   -0.0821**    -0.0084   -0.0300   -0.0460    -0.0359      0.0122    -0.0089 
    (-2.03)    (-2.35)    (-0.14)    (-0.55)    (-0.65)     (-0.50)       (0.18)      (-0.13) 
ln(1+π)    -0.1550*   -0.1560*   -0.1189**   -0.1014**   -0.2850**    -0.2743**      0.1057     0.0368 
    (-3.78)   (-3.82)    (-2.31)    (-2.13)    (-2.60)     (-2.48)       (0.88)      (0.30) 
σx    -0.0023*   -0.0028*   -0.0060   -0.0024   -0.0020**    -0.0022**     -0.0029**    -0.0032** 
    (-3.14)   (-3.65)    (-0.96)    (-0.41)    (-2.39)     (-2.53)      (-2.07)     (-2.31) 
σtot     0.00003    0.00004    0.0023‡   0.0030**   -0.0001    -0.0001     -0.0023    -0.0018 
    (0.23)    (0.30)     (1.78)     (2.46)     (-0.60)     (-0.60)      (-1.05)     (-0.81) 
σpd     0.0006‡‡    0.0008‡    0.0009**   0.0011**   -0.0001    -0.0002     -0.0028‡    -0.0027‡‡ 
    (1.60)    (1.94)     (2.00)     (2.58)     (-0.06)     (-0.16)      (-1.74)     (-1.70) 
σπ     0.0116‡‡    0.0117‡‡   -0.0021   -0.0048   0.0389**    0.0370**     -0.0353**    -0.0274‡ 
    (1.33)    (1.35)     (-0.12)    (-0.30)    (2.11)      (1.99)      (-2.05)     (-1.58) 
 
R
_ 2
    0.3040  0.3101  0.5789  0.6427  0.3076   0.3065      0.7703     0.7779 
SEE    0.1166  0.1161  0.1136  0.1750  0.1400   0.1166      0.0864     0.0850 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
Note: The dependent variable, in each case, is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity. Other variables are defined as follows: x is the export-GDP ratio; tot is the 
terms of trade; pd is the local price deviation from purchasing power parity; π is the inflation rate; d75 equals zero in 1960-64, 1965-69, and 1970-74 and equals one in 
1975-79, 1080-84, and 1985-89; and σi equals the standard deviation of i = x, tot, pd, and π over each 5-year sub-period. Moreover, just like the time dummy variables 
(results suppressed in this table), d75 is not adjusted for its mean in the fixed-effect estimation. 
 
* significant at the 1-percent level;  ** significant at the 5-percent level. 
‡ significant at the 10-percent level;  ‡‡ significant at the 20-percent level. 
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Table 5: Total Factor Productivity Regressions 
  (geographic regions) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
       lntfp (Africa: 19 cntrs)          lntfp (L. Amer: 22 cntrs)     lntfp (Asia: 17 cntrs)        lntfp (Erp+: 25 cntrs)     _        
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
lnH     0.0058  -0.1160**      -0.0697     -0.1867**     0.0922    0.0097   0.0416   0.2535* 
     (0.13)    (-2.15)       (-1.09)      (-2.20)     (1.10)    (0.08)     (0.68)      (3.75) 
lnx     0.0827**  -0.3439*      0.1482*     -0.2646‡‡     0.0822‡‡   -0.1545   0.0725‡    0.7212* 
     (2.43)    (-2.71)       (3.91)      (-1.30)     (1.32)    (-0.61)    (1.56)      (5.61) 
lnH lnx     0.0510*             0.0461**      0.0254       -0.0707* 
       (3.47)         (2.06)      (0.96)       (-5.33) 
lntot     0.0086   0.0086     0.0218     0.0144     0.0070    0.0070   0.2621*    0.1690** 
     (0.23)     (0.25)        (0.99)      (0.66)     (0.10)    (0.10)     (3.50)      (2.44) 
lnpd     0.0820**   0.0456     0.0555     0.0518    -0.2600*   -0.2689*  -0.1038‡‡   -0.0844 
     (1.24)     (0.72)        (0.82)      (0.78)    (-2.62)    (-2.70)   (-1.39)    (-1.26) 
ln(1+π)   -0.1155**  -0.1083**     -0.0408    -0.0520   -0.0985   -0.0389   0.0308   0.0656 
    (-2.27)  (-2.26)       (-0.53)      (-0.69)    (-0.27)    (-0.11)    (0.14)      (0.34) 
σx   -0.0024  -0.0013     -0.0009    -0.0007    0.0048    0.0048  -0.0016**   -0.0025* 
    (-0.44)  (-0.24)       (-0.27)     (-0.21)     (0.65)    (0.65)     (-2.38)     (-4.01) 
σtot    0.0025**   0.0026    -0.00003    -0.00001   -0.0077*   -0.0071**   -0.0003    0.0007 
    (1.96)    (2.14)       (-0.25)     (-0.11)    (-2.91)    (-2.58)    (-0.10)     (0.29) 
σpd    0.0005  0.0008‡     0.0008‡     0.00004    0.0002   0.0008  -0.0029‡   -0.0025‡ 
    (1.15)    (1.73)       (0.09)      (0.05)    (0.05)     (0.14)     (-1.52)    (-1.49) 
σπ   -0.0048‡‡  -0.0055     -0.0353**     0.0039   -0.0301   -0.0421   -0.0546   -0.0535 
    (-0.28)   (-0.34)      (-2.05)      (0.35)    (-0.08)   (-0.11)    (-1.00)    (-1.09) 
 
R
_ 2
   0.6867   0.7247      0.3578    0.3789   0.5207  0.5202   0.3849   0.5078 
SEE   0.1098   0.1029      0.0785    0.0772   0.1452  0.1453   0.0769   0.0687 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
Note: The dependent variable, in each case, is the natural logarithm of total factor productivity. Other variables are defined as follows: x is the export-GDP ratio; tot is the 
terms of trade; pd is the local price deviation from purchasing power parity; π is the inflation rate; d75 equals zero in 1960-64, 1965-69, and 1970-74 and equals one in 
1975-79, 1080-84, and 1985-89; and σi equals the standard deviation of i = x, tot, pd, and π over each 5-year sub-period. Moreover, just like the time dummy variables 
(results suppressed in this table), d75 is not adjusted for its mean in the fixed-effect estimation. 
 
* significant at the 1-percent level;  ** significant at the 5-percent level. 
‡ significant at the 10-percent level;  ‡‡ significant at the 20-percent level. 
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Table 6: Human Capital and Openness Interaction for Countries  
 Classified by 1960-64 Income 
 All  
Countries 
Low  
Income 
Middle 
Income 
High  
Income 
Ln H –0.0961 –0.1041   0.1246   0.1805 
Ln x   0.0925 –0.4192   0.2052   0.8285 
Ln H ln x   0.0395   0.0569 ns –0.0645 
Openness  
   Threshold (x) 
11.4 
(1.3, 141) 
6.2 
(1.3, 75.3) 
-- 
(4.0, 141.2) 
16.4 
(3.8, 69.0) 
Human-Capital 
Threshold (ln H) 
-- 
(3.4, 14.2) 
7.4 
(3.4, 13.8) 
-- 
(5.6, 13.4) 
12.8 
(6.0, 14.2) 
Note: Coefficient estimates appear only if significant at the 20-percent level or 
better; ns means not significant; and – means not calculated. The openness 
threshold indicates the export to GDP percentage above which the 
coefficient on human capital changes sign. The numbers in parentheses 
give the range over which the export to GDP percentage varies for the 
respective sample. For example, the coefficient on human capital in the all-
countries regression equals –0.0961. Once the ratio of exports to GDP 
exceeds 11.4 percent, then the positive coefficient on the human capital 
and export interaction term flips the combined sign on human capital to a 
positive value. The reverse story holds for the high-income regression. The 
human-capital threshold indicates the value of ln H above which the 
coefficient on openness (ln x) changes sign. The numbers in parentheses 
give the range over which ln H varies for the respective sample. (Recall 
that H equals the stock of human capital in the country, not human capital 
per worker.) For example, the coefficient on openness in the low-income 
country regression equals –0.4192. Once the ln H number exceeds 7.4, 
then the positive coefficient on ln H human capital openness interaction 
term flips the combined sign on openness to a positive value. And 7.4 falls 
within the range over which ln H  varies (i.e., 3.4 to 13.8) for the low-
income countries in the sample. 
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Table 7: Human Capital and Openness Interaction for Countries  
 Classified by 1970s Income 
 All  
Countries 
Low  
Income 
Middle 
Income 
High  
Income 
Ln H –0.0961 –0.1210   0.1239   0.1550 
Ln x   0.0925 –0.4215   0.1940   0.7266 
Ln H ln x   0.0395   0.0600 ns –0.0561 
Openness  
   Threshold (x) 
11.4 
(1.3, 141.2) 
7.5 
(1.3, 75.3) 
-- 
(2.1, 141.2) 
15.8 
(3.8, 69.0) 
Human-Capital 
Threshold (ln H) 
-- 
(3.4, 14.2) 
7.0 
(3.4, 13.8) 
-- 
(5.6, 12.1) 
13.0 
(6.0, 14.2) 
Note: See Table 6. 
 
 
Table 8: Human Capital and Openness Interaction for Countries  
 Classified by Geographic Regions 
 All  
(83 
Countries) 
Africa  
(19 Countries)
Latin 
American  
(22 Countries)
Asia  
(17 
Countries) 
Europe  
(25 Countries)
ln H –0.0961 –0.1160 –0.1867 ns 0.2535 
ln x   0.0925 –0.3439 –0.2646 ns 0.7212 
ln H ln x   0.0395   0.0510   0.0461 ns –0.0707 
Openness  
   Threshold (x) 
11.4 
(1.3, 141.2) 
9.7 
(1.3, 75.3) 
57.4 
(4.0, 69.0) 
-- 
(2.1, 141.2) 
36.1 
(3.8, 100.1) 
Human-Capital 
Threshold (ln H) 
-- 
(3.4, 14.2) 
6.7 
(3.4, 11.0) 
5.7 
(6.2, 12.1) 
-- 
(6.4, 13.8) 
10.2 
(6.0, 14.2) 
Note: See Table 6. 
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Appendix:  
Table 1A: Countries Classified by Income Per Worker in the Beginning and Middle of the Sample Period 
   
Income Per Worker during 1960-64 Income Per Worker during 1970s 
22 Low: 38 Middle: 23 High:  22 Low: 36 Middle: 25 High: 
Bangladesh Algeria Argentina Bangladesh Algeria Argentina 
Botswana Barbados Australia Botswana Barbados Australia 
Ghana Bolivia Austria Ghana Bolivia Austria 
Guinea-Bissau Brazil Belgium Guinea-Bissau Brazil Belgium 
Haiti Chile Canada Haiti Chile Canada 
India Colombia Denmark India Colombia Denmark 
Indonesia Cyprus Finland Indonesia Cyprus Finland 
Kenya Dom. Republic France Kenya Dom. Republic France 
Korea, Rep. Ecuador Germany, W. Lesotho Ecuador Germany, W. 
Lesotho El Salvador Iceland Malawi El Salvador Iceland 
Malawi Fiji Iran Mozambique Fiji Iran 
Mozambique Greece Israel Niger Greece Ireland 
Niger Guatemala Italy P. New Guinea Guatemala Israel 
P. New Guinea Guyana Mexico Pakistan Guyana Italy 
Pakistan Honduras Netherlands Senegal Honduras Japan 
Senegal Hong Kong New Zealand Sri Lanka Hong Kong Mexico 
Thailand Ireland Norway Thailand Jamaica Netherlands 
Togo Jamaica Spain Togo Jordan New Zealand 
Uganda Japan Sweden Uganda Korea, Rep. Norway 
Zaire Jordan Trinidad &Tob. Zaire Malaysia Spain 
Zambia Malaysia U.K. Zambia Malta Sweden 
Zimbabwe Malta U.S.A. Zimbabwe Mauritius Trinidad &Tob. 
 Mauritius Venezuela Nicaragua U.K. 
 Nicaragua Panama U.S.A. 
 Panama Paraguay Venezuela 
 Paraguay Peru 
 Peru Philippines 
 Philippines Portugal 
 Portugal Singapore 
 Singapore South Africa 
 South Africa Swaziland 
 Sri Lanka Syria 
 Swaziland Tunisia 
 Syria Turkey 
 Tunisia Uruguay 
 Turkey Yugoslavia 
 Uruguay  
 Yugoslavia  
Note: Number of countries in low-income categories (union of 60-64 and 70s): 23, of which Sri Lanka is not in 60-
64 classification, and S. Korea is not in the 70s classification. Number of countries in middle-income 
categories (union of 60-64 and 70s): 39, of which Korea is not in 60-64 classification, and Ireland, Japan and 
Sri Lanka are not in the 70s classification. Number of countries in high-income categories (union of 60-64 
and 70s): 25, of which Ireland and Japan are not in 60-64 classification, but all countries appear in the 70s 
classification. 
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Table 2A: Countries Classified by Geographic Region 
 
  
Africa: 19 Asia+: 17 Europe+: 25 L. America: 22
  
Algeria Bangladesh Canada Barbados 
Botswana Hong Kong U.S.A. Dom. Republic 
Ghana India Japan El Salvador 
Guinea-Bissau Indonesia Austria Guatemala 
Kenya Iran Belgium Haiti 
Lesotho Israel Cyprus Honduras 
Malawi Jordan Denmark Jamaica 
Mauritius Korea, Rep. Finland Mexico 
Mozambique Malaysia France Nicaragua 
Niger Pakistan Germany, W. Panama 
Senegal Philippines Greece Trinidad &Tob. 
South Africa Singapore Iceland Argentina 
Swaziland Sri Lanka Ireland Bolivia 
Togo Syria Italy Brazil 
Tunisia Thailand Malta Chile 
Uganda Fiji Netherlands Colombia 
Zaire P. New Guinea Norway Ecuador 
Zambia  Portugal Guyana 
Zimbabwe  Spain Paraguay 
  Sweden Peru 
  Turkey Uruguay 
  U.K. Venezuela 
  Yugoslavia 
  Australia 
  New Zealand 
Note:  Except for Algeria and Tunisia, all the countries in Africa 
listed here are situated in sub-Saharan Africa. Fiji is located in 
the Pacific but included here in Asia+. Japan is categorized 
under Europe+. Five countries from outside of Europe have 
been included in Europe+: Canada, U.S., Japan, Australia, and 
New Zealand. Latin America includes Central America 
(including Mexico), the Caribbean, and South America. 
 
